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SCHOOL PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SILENCE IS GOLDEN
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated little toler-
ance for mandated prayer in the public schools.' During the past
twenty-five years, the Court not only has held that a state cannot
require prayers to be recited in the public schools; ' it also has de-
clared unconstitutional a state law providing that each public school
day begin with a moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary
prayer. "'
Despite the Court's apparent desire to keep sectarian influence
outside public school walls, there have been numerous attempts to
return organized religious activity to the public school classroom.
Proponents of school prayer have proposed in Congress hundreds
of constitutional amendments to permit voluntary prayer in the pub-
lic schools.4 They also have introduced in Congress bills to curtail
1. The first amendment commands in part: "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The religion clauses are referred to respectively as the establishment
clause and the free exercise clause. Silent moment laws raise questions only under the
establishment clause. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
2. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (declaring daily
Bible readings violative of establishment clause); Engel, 370 U.S. at 424 (holding oral
recitation of prayer composed by school board unconstitutional).
3. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985) (striking down moment-of-si-
lence statute because of express legislative intent to return prayer to public schools)
(emphasis added).
4. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE,
Rep. No. 81-34A, at 75 (1981). President Reagan unsuccessfully proposed an amend-
ment which read: "'Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual
or group prayer in public schools or other public institutions. No person shall be re-
quired by the United States or any State to participate in prayer." President's Message
to the Congress Transmitting a Proposed Constitutional Amendment on Prayer in
School, I PUB. PAPERS 647, 648 (May 17, 1982).
The President's amendment would have permitted government-sponsored, teacher-
led recitation of prayer by public school children. Contra Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 (estab-
lishment clause at very least means that "it is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a
religious program carried on by government"); see Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221 (quoting
Engel, 370 U.S. at 425).
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the federal court's jurisdiction to hear school prayer cases.5 The
state and local governments, however, have led the most visible and
controversial effort to return prayer to the public school classroom.
Many state legislatures and local school boards defend daily mo-
ments of silence as a means of accommodating religion in the public
schools while remaining within constitutional bounds.
Twenty-one states, including Maryland, permit or require stu-
dents in public school classrooms to observe a moment of silence.6
A few states require students to spend time in silent meditation.'
But the typical statute mandates silence at the beginning of each
school day for meditation, reflection or prayer."
Those who support a silent moment assert that it does not vio-
late the principle of separation of church and state. A silent mo-
ment gives public school children the opportunity to pray, but
neither forces them to pray nor interferes with those who wish to
contemplate secular matters.' The Supreme Court struck down one
moment-of-silence statute, enacted "for meditation or voluntary
prayer,"' 0 but has not ruled on the validity of other types of silence
5. See, e.g., Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings-Federal Court Jurisdiction: Hearings on
S. 450 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter Helms Hearings].
6. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (1987); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-522 (1984); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 6-16-119 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-16a (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
14, § 4101 (1981 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. § 233.062 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-
1050 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 122, para. 771 (Smith-Hurd 1961 & Supp. 1988); IND.
CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-7-11 (Burns 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72.5308a (1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 4805 (1983); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-104 (1989); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 71, § Ia (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); MICH. Corp. LAWS ANN. § 380.1565
(West 1988); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3029-a (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-30.1
(1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.60.1 (Anderson 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-12-3.1 (1988); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 22.1-203 (1985); W. VA. CONST. art. il, § 15-a; see also Note, Daily Moments of Silence in
Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 407-08 (1983) (chart com-
paring 18 of these statutes).
7. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-522 (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-16a
(1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-12-3.1 (1988).
8. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-16-119 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1987);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para. 771 (Smith-Hurd 1961 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 20-10.1-7-11 (Burns 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5308a (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
9. See, e.g., Helms Hearings, supra note 6, at 509-10 (statement of Rep... Collins); id.
at 517-19 (testimony of Rep. Holt).
10. In Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985), the Court declared unconstitutional
an Alabama statute authorizing a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer."
The Court found that the legislative history underlying the statute's enactment demon-
strated a blatant intent to return prayer to the public school classroom. Id. at 60. Be-
cause most silence statutes are not as rich in legislative history-some states do not even
record it-many commentators have critizedjaffree as providing little guidance for future
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statutes, such as those creating a pure moment of silence." Lower
federal courts are divided on the constitutionality of pure silence
statutes, although most courts have invalidated them.'"
This comment addresses whether pure moment-of-silence stat-
utes conform with the establishment clause. Part I reviews the his-
tory behind the enactment of the establishment clause and examines
the Supreme Court's approach to establishment clause cases. Part
II discusses Supreme Court cases involving prayer in the public
schools, and Part III analyzes the constitutionality of silent moment
laws, particularly the State of Maryland's silent moment statute.
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that some silent moment
statutes are unconstitutional, this comment concludes that the
Court would uphold pure silence statutes.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The History Behind its Enactment
Many colonists departed England for religious freedom in
America because of the promulgation of governmentally composed
school prayer cases. See, e.g., Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status
of Religious Speech by Private Speahers, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 58 (1986) (stating that Wallace
was decided on the "narrowest possible ground"); Comment, Constitutional Law--First
Amendment-A oment of Silence in Public Schools, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 737, 738 (1986) (conclud-
ing that much remains to be clarified in moment of silence cases); Note, Wallace v.Jaffree:
Which Statutes Authorizing "Aloments of Silence" in Public Schools are Constitutional?, 30 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 1243, 1244 (1986) (failing to set out criteria for future moment-of-silence
cases). But see infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text (reasoning that theJaffree hold-
ing was based on alternative, more concrete grounds).
1I. Pure moment-of-silence statutes establish a silent moment without specifying in
any way that the moment is for prayer. An example of a pure silence statute is Rhode
Island's, which states in pertinent part:
At the opening of every school day in all grades in all public schools the teacher
in charge of the room in which each class is held shall announce that a period of
silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation,
and during this period silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-12-3.1 (1988). Even a silence statute that is pure on its face could
be found unconstitutional because of its application or its legislative history. See infra
note 105. The Court strongly indicated in dicta that it would uphold pure silent mo-
ment statutes. See infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
12. Compare Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337, 340 (D. Mass. 1976) (upholding
statute "for meditation or prayer") with May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240, 253 (3d Cir.
1985) (striking down pure statute as lacking secular purpose); Karen B. v. Treen, 653
F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1981) (invalidating statute that permitted voluntary oral prayer),
aff'd mem., 455 U.S. 913 (1982); Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013,
1018-19 (D.N.M. 1983) (declaring statute for "contemplation, meditation or prayer" un-
constitutional); and Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161, 1166 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (inval-
idating prayer statute).
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prayers.' 3 In England the Book of Common Prayer (the Book) detailed
the accepted form and content of prayer and of other religious prac-
tices in the established Church of England.' 4 The Book was the
source of constant controversy because its contents frequently
changed with the views of each new ruler.'" While powerful groups
in the mainstream of the Church of England sought to influence the
Book's contents, groups without political influence left the religious
melee in England for religious freedom in America.
Ironically, several groups opposing religious oppression in
England gained control of colonial governments in America and
passed laws designating their own religion as the official sect of their
respective colonies.' 6 During the Revolutionary War period, colo-
nists established churches in the majority of the thirteen colonies
and favored religions in most other colonies.' 7 But opposition to
the governmental establishment of religion followed the Revolu-
tion. For example, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson led those
opposed to the established Episcopal Church in Virginia to enact
the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty."8 The Bill required the gov-
13. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-26, 429 (1947) (centuries immediately
before and contemporaneous with colonization of America were filled with "anguish,
hardship and bitter strife," generated by struggle between religious sects determined to
obtain exclusive governmental approval).
14. The BooK OF COMMON PRAYER (the Book) was approved by Acts of Parliament
and created under the direction of the government in 1548, 2 & 3 Edw. 4. c. 1, entitled
"An Act for Uniformity of Service and Administration of the Sacraments throughout the
Realm," and in 1549, 3 & 4 Edw. 4, c. 10, entitled "An Act for the abolishing and putting
aways of divers books and images." For a complete description of the Book's provisions
and history, see L. PULLAN, THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER (1900).
15. See L. PULLAN, supra note 14, at vii-xvi.
16. For a description of the types of religious laws enacted by early New England
settlers, see V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1930).
17. The Church of England was the established church in Virginia, Carolina, Mary-
land, New Jersey, and Georgia. S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA
75, 116, 386, 405-06, 420-21 (1902). The Congregationalist Church officially was estab-
lished in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. In New York and New
Jersey the Church of England received substantial support. Id. at 340, 405. In Delaware
and Pennsylvania all Christian sects received fairly equal treatment, but Catholics were
discriminated against in some respects. Id. at 47-48.
18. Act of Oct. 17, 1785, ch. 35, 1785 Va. Acts 84 (entitled "An act for establishing
religious freedom"). The preamble to the Act stated in part:
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by
temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to be-
get habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the
Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose
not to propagate it by coercions on either ....
Id. The statute itself stated "[t]hat no man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained,
molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of
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ernment to treat all religions equally. Other states passed similar
legislation thereafter.' 9
By the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, many Americans
knew that "one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the indi-
vidual to worship in his own way lay in the Government's placing its
official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one
particular form of religious services. ' 20 Therefore, the founding fa-
thers intended the religion clauses of the first amendment to curtail
the government's power to interfere with a person's freedom to be-
lieve and to worship according to the dictates of his or her con-
science. 2 ' The first amendment's proscription of governmental
interference with religion became applicable to the states when the
Supreme Court determined that the fourteenth amendment prohib-
ited a state from depriving any person of liberty without due process
of law.22
The first amendment prohibits both state and federal govern-
ments from establishing an official church or religion. But the
amendment forbids more than just an established Church of
America or Church of Maryland; it forbids all laws "respecting an es-
tablishment of religion. '2 3 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
clause to mean: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. '24 Therefore, the
his religious opinions or belief .. " Id. at 86. For an account of the background of this
law, see S. COBB, supra note 17, at 74-115, 482-99.
19. See S. COBB, supra note 17, at 482-509.
20. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962).
21. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985). One constitutional scholar wrote:
"The manifest object of the men who framed the institutions of the country, was to have
a State without religion, and a Church without politics . . . . As the Church takes no note of
men's political differences, so the State looks with equal eye on all modes of religious
faith." J. BLAcK, Religious Liberty, in ESSAYS AND SPEECHES OFJEREMIAH S. BLACK 53 (C.
Black ed. 1886) (emphasis in original).
22. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court stated:
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amend-
ment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment
has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact
such laws.
Id. at 303.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
24. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). See also Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (rejecting "unequivocally" contentions that estab-
lishment clause forbids only government preference for one religion over another); Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (stating that neither state nor federal
1022 [VOL. 48:1018
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government may not favor a specific religious practice or denomina-
tion; indeed, government is forbidden to favor all religions.
B. Establishment Clause Analysis of Governmental Action
1. A Wall of Separation Between Church and State.-The Supreme
Court considered its first case under the establishment clause in
1947. In Everson v. Board of Education25 the Court recognized that
"in the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to
suppress, 26 the establishment clause means "at least" that neither
a state nor the federal government "cn pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 27
The Court stated that there must be a " 'wall of separation between
church and State' 82 and that government must pursue a course of
government can pass laws "or impose requirements which aid all religions as against
non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded on different beliefs") (footnotes omitted); Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1961) (noting that the first amendment "did
not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting
an establishment ofreligion. Thus, this Court has given the Amendment a 'broad interpre-
tation . . .in the-light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress
."') (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-15) (emphasis added by McGowan Court).
25. 330 U.S. I (1947). The Court assessed the constitutionality of a statute authoriz-
ing monetary reimbursement to parents transporting their children to and from school
on buses operated by the public transportation system. Id. at 3. A portion of the reim-
bursement covered children transported to Catholic parochial schools. Id.
26. Id. at 14-15. See id. at 8-16 (history of establishment clause); supra notes 13-24
and accompanying text.
27. 330 U.S. at 15. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The Court found the
reimbursement program not an establishment of religion because the program was im-
plemented pursuant to the state's power to legislate for the public welfare. The statute
was enacted to enable children, irrespective of their religious convictions, to travel to
and from school safely. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. Recognizing an incidental benefit to
children attending parochial schools, the Court nonetheless refused to find the benefit a
violation of the establishment clause, comparing it to the benefit the children enjoy from
state-salaried policemen who patrol the streets during school hours to protect all chil-
dren from traffic. Id. at 17.
28. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (Mormon
challenge under free exercise clause to federal polygamy law)). The wall of separation
language originally appeared in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist
Association. See 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H. Washington ed. 1879).
While it is likely that the wall of separation theory was an interpretation of the estab-
lishment clause intended to guide courts in future cases, Justices even have dissented
over this interpretation. See. e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (wall of separation theory "based on bad history" and "should be frankly
and explicitly abandoned"); see also id. at 91-106 (examination of history indicating ab-
sence of historical basis for theory of rigid separation between church and state). But see
Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality towards Religion under the Establishment Clause: The
Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1049, 1053 n.35 (1986)
(finding Justice Rehnquist's historical analysis unpersuasive).
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neutrality toward religion.29
2. Historical Analysis.-After Everson the Court tried to clarify
which state sponsored activities are religious in nature and thereby
violative of the establishment clause. The Court's analysis focused
on the history and purpose of the establishment clause.30 In Engel v.
Vitale, s' for example, the Court invalidated a prayer that the State of
New York composed for recitation in the public schools.3 2 To as-
sess the constitutionality of the state's prayer under the establish-
ment clause, the Court examined the history of the clause," noting
that the governmental practice of composing prayers and compel-
ling citizens to recite them was one of the reasons colonists left Eng-
land for America.34 A year later, however, in Abington School District
v. Schempp s3 the Court began to displace the tenuous historical anal-
ysis with a more concrete test.3 6
29. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (first amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its
relation with groups of religious believers and non-believers"). The doctrine of neutral-
ity has been reiterated and refined by the Court in a number of cases. See, e.g.,Jaffree, 472
U.S. at 60 (course of "complete neutrality" toward religion); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) (establishment clause com-
pels government to "pursue a course of'neutrality' toward religion"); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("In the relationship between man and reli-
gion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality. Though the application of
that rule requires interpretation of a delicate sort, the rule itself is clearly and concisely
stated in the words of the First Amendment."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)
("first and most immediate purpose [of the establishment clause] rested on the belief
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade
religion"); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (no government "can constitu-
tionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion' "); Zorach v. Clau-
son, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (separation between church and state must be "complete
and unequivocal"); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948)(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[sleparation is a requirement to abstain from fusing func-
tions of Government and of religious sects, not merely to treat them all equally").
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the establishment clause was influenced in
part by James Madison's argument that even minor state promotions of religion parallel
the state sponsored religious persecutions acknowledged and feared by many colonists.
In Schempp the Court noted: "The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream
may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, 'it is proper to
take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.' " 374 U.S. at 225 (citation omitted).
30. The Court applied this strictly historical analysis in Engel, 370 U.S. at 425-36, and
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312-14.
31. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
32. Id. at 424. New York's prayer is set forth infra note 58.
33. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 425-35.
34. Id. at 426-27. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
35. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
36. Justice Brennan, concurring in Schempp, advanced persuasive arguments for
abandoning the historical approach to deciding establishment clause cases. Brennan
doubted that insight into the history of and intent behind the enactment of the first
1024 [VOL. 48:1018
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3. The Lemon Test.-Recognizing this historical command, the
Schempp Court devised a test to protect the neutrality between
church and state. To withstand establishment clause strictures, a
governmental activity must have a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." In
Lemon v. Kurtzman' s the Court reformulated the Schempp test into a
three-prong test;39 a governmental activity must satisfy all three
prongs to be found constitutional.4" First, the activity must have a
secular legislative purpose;4 1 second, it must have a principal or pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;4" and third,
the activity must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion. 43 Although the seemingly straightforward Lemon test
has been criticized heavily as an unworkable fiction, 44 the Supreme
amendment could resolve every concrete problem arising under the establishment
clause. Id. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring). First, he argued that recorded history is
ambiguous and statements to support conflicting interpretations of the establishment
clause are abundant. Id. at 237-38. Second, with respect to religion in the public
schools, Brennan recognized that the structure of American education has changed sig-
nificantly since the first amendment was adopted. Id. at 238. Because education origi-
nally was in private sectarian hands, the fact that devotional exercises in the classroom
did not meet with criticism is inapposite to evaluating the same exercises in today's pub-
lic schools. Id. at 238-39. Brennan also emphasized that modern America is more relig-
iously diverse than was the America of our forefathers. d. at 240. Thus, practices
acceptable then may be objectionable now. id. at 240-41. Finally, Justice Brennan
stressed that the American experiment in public education has been guided in a large
part by our increasing religious diversity: "public schools serve a uniquely public func-
tion: the training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or
separatist influences of any sort-an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heri-
tage common to all American groups and religions." Id. at 241-42 (emphasis in
original).
37. Id. at 222. The Schempp test was an exclusive test-if a court found either no
secular legislative purpose or a primary effect advancing or inhibiting religion, then the
government practice under scrutiny would be found unconstitutional. Id.
Critics say that this test was an inaccurate reformulation of the earlier principle that
if the primary effect or purpose behind the enactment of a statute is the advancement or
inhibition of religion, it violates the establishment clause. See infra notes 100-101 and
accompanying text.
38. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
39. Id. at 612-13.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 612. This prong has caused controversy among Justices and conmentators
alike. See infra note 44.
42. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
43. Id. at 613. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (origin of
third prong of Lemon test).
44. Justice O'Connor proposed to refine the purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon
test in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Jus-
tice O'Connor's endorsement test is based on the premise that one principle behind the
establishment clause is that government may not act to endorse or disapprove of reli-
gion. Id. at 687-88. Believing that the Lemon test does not account for institutional en-
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Court continues to apply its three prongs when analyzing possible
establishment clause violations. 5
dorsement or disapproval of religion, Justice O'Connor submitted that the proper
inquiry under the purpose prong is whether government "intends to convey a message
of endorsement or disapproval of religion." Id at 691. She also stated that the effect
prong should not focus on whether a government practice in fact advances or inhibits
religion, but rather should focus on whether the government practice has "the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion." Id.
at 691-92. Thus under the endorsement test, a court must examine whether govern-
ment's purpose is to endorse religion (subjective test) and whether its actions actually
convey a message of endorsement (objective test). Id. at 690.
In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985),Justice O'Connor again proposed the en-
dorsement test, noting that it "does not preclude government from . . . taking religion
into account in making law and policy. [But] [ilt does preclude government from con-
veying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is
favored or preferred." Id. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor's insight into the purpose prong of the Lemon test was approved
and the majority of the Court expressly adopted it inJaffree: "In applying the purpose
test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or dis-
approve of religion.' " Id. at 56 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). In a footnote the Court, however, quoted Justice
O'Connor's complete test which refined the purpose prong and the effect prong of the
Lemon test. See id. at 56 n.42. The Court has not adopted the endorsement inquiry
under the effect prong, but it is logical to expect that it will do so.
Then ChiefJustice Burger also criticized the Lemon test. He believed that the Lemon
test evidenced the Court's "naive preoccupation with an easy, bright-line approach for
addressing constitutional issues." Id. at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
believed the Lemon test, like the wall of separation theory, was without historical founda-
tion and inadequate for deciding establishment clause cases. Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J..
dissenting); see supra note 28.
Various commentators have criticized the Lemon test, in many instances proposing
new tests purportedly easier to apply. See, e.g., Dellinger, The Sound of Silence: An Epistle
on Prayer and the Constitution, 95 YALE LJ. 1631, 1638 (1986) (secular purpose prong is an
inaccurate reformulation of principle that if purpose of enactment is advancement or
disapproval of religion, it violates establishment clause); Loewy, supra note 28, at 1051
(endorsement test clarifies establishment clause analysis); Note, lVallace v. Jafree and the
Need to Reform Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CAmrn. U.L. REV. 573, 591 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Need to Reform] (proposing that the test be "whether the government's action
has the direct or indirect effect of influencing or coercing an individual's religious be-
liefs"); Note, supra note 6, at 386 (proposing the following test: "If an activity would be
or generally is regarded as religious, then it should be considered an unconstitutional
establishment of religion") (emphasis omitted); Note, supra note 10, at 1254 (proposing
the following test: "All moment-of-silence statutes are constitutional unless they clearly
establish governmental preference of one religious practice over another") (emphasis
omitted). This comment does not profess to guide the Supreme Court in establishment
clause cases but instead recognizes the gradual improvement of the Lemon test because
of refinements such as Justice O'Connor's endorsement inquiry.
45. The Court sometimes returns to an historical analysis. In Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983), for example, the Court declared constitutional the daily invocation
in the Nebraska state legislature. Id. at 795. The Court recognized the traditional na-
ture of this practice in the federal and state legislatures since the Constitution was
adopted and the framers of the first amendment clearly did not intend to prohibit this.
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III. THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES
Despite the numerous cases before the Supreme Court impli-
cating the establishment clause, those involving public schools have
been relatively rare. The Court has reviewed public school activity
under the establishment clause seven times,46 and it has invalidated
the activity under scrutiny in all but one of these cases.47
These decisions demonstrate that the Court has constructed an
impermeable wall of separation between church and state when the
government's religious activity under challenge involves public edu-
cation.48 The Court has applied stricter standards of separation to
Id. at 786-91. See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-85 (applying both historical analysis and
Lemon test).
46. The seven cases are: Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (moment-of-silence
statute "for meditation or voluntary prayer"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
(posting of the ten commandments in public school classrooms); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (statute prohibiting teaching of Darwinian theory of evolution); Ab-
ington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (statutes requiring recitation of
Bible verses and Lord's Prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state-composed
prayer for recitation in public school classrooms); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) (released time program for off-campus religious education); Illinois ex rel. McCol-
lum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time program for on-campus reli-
gious instruction). In Karcher v. May, 108 S. Ct. 388 (1987), the Court refused to decide
the constitutionality of a pure moment-of-silence statute because of a lack of jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 395.
47. In Zorach the Court upheld a released time program providing for the dismissal
of public school students who received religious instruction at religious centers located
off public school property. 343 U.S. at 315. The Court stated that mere accommoda-
tion, as opposed to active promotion, of religious activities is acceptable in light of the
history of the establishment clause. d. It determined that it "would have to press the
concept of separation of Church and State to [the extreme] to condemn the [released
time program] on constitutional grounds." Id. at 313.
In AcColtum the Court invalidated a different released time program in which the
children received religious education on school property. 333 U.S. at 231. Although the
religious instructors were privately employed-so that no public funds were expended-
the Court found that the program presented "powerful elements of inherent pressure by
the school system in the interest of religious sects," and so violated the establishment
clause. d. at 227. See also Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 ("When the power, prestige and finan-
cial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially ap-
proved religion is plain.").
48. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 230 (Brennan,J., concurring) ("The Court's historic duty
to expound the meaning of the Constitution has encountered few issues more intricate
or more demanding than that of the relationship between religion and the public
schools.").
Activities with a religious aspect have not been excluded entirely from the public
school classroom. The Court has approved the objective study of the Bible or religion
as part of a secular program of education. Id. at 225. The Court also would allow the
rc(itation of the Declaration of Independence, which contains references to God, and
lic Pledge ofAllegiance, which contains a profession of faith in a Supreme Being. Engel,
370 U.S. at 435 n.21. The Court views these activities as educational, patriotic or cere-
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the public schools because of the unique role of public education in
American society.. First, the Court considers public schools the
"symbol of our democracy" 49
-where children can be trained in an
atmosphere free. from religious influence-in which the state must
not manifest a preference for a particular sect or religious prac-
tice.5" Second, the state must not even appear to show religious
preferences because school-age children are vulnerable to such poli-
cies. These children are vulnerable because they are susceptible to
the influence of teachers and peers 5' and because they are subject
to compulsory attendance requirements.52 Third, religious beliefs
monial which bear no resemblance to obviously religious exercises such as recited
prayer. Id.
49. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 23 1. See Note, supra note 6, at 379 (public schools are the
"breeding ground of democracy").
50. Note, supra note 6, at 379. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216-17 (public schools must
"keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of [religious] sects"); Schempp,
374 U.S. at 241-42 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is implicit in the history and character
of American public education that the public schools serve a uniquely public function:
the training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separa-
tist influences of any sort-an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage
common to all American groups and religions.") (emphasis in original).
51. Note, supra note 6, at 379. In Brandon .v. Board of Educ. of Guilderland Cent.
School Dist., 635 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981), for
example, the Second Circuit held that a student prayer group could not hold communal
prayer meetings on school property before school commenced. The court noted:
Our nation's elementary and secondary schools play a unique role in trans-
mitting basic and fundamental values to our youth. To an impressionable stu-
dent, even the mere appearance of secular involvement in religious activities
might indicate that the state has placed its imprimatur on a particular religious
creed. This symbolic inference is too dangerous to permit.
Id. at 978. In Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981), the Ninth Circuit relied on Brandon to hold unconstitutional
a student council's religious exercises held prior to school assemblies. Id. at 762-63.
The voluntary nature of the participation did not sway the court. It found that students
were forced to choose between listening to prayer or not attending an important school
function, believing it "difficult to conceive how this choice would not coerce a student
wishing to be part of the social mainstream and, thus, advance one group's religious
beliefs." Id. at 762. See also Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1016
(D.N.M. 1983) (expert testimony that "children are extremely impressionable and easily
influenced . . . [;J [t]hey exhibit a tendency to conform with each other in dress and
behavior, and it is psychologically disturbing for a child to be different from his peers");
cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n. 14, 277 (1981) (Court invalidated university
regulation prohibiting use of university facilities for religious purposes, noting that uni-
versity students are young adults, not as impressionable as younger children).
52. Compulsory attendance brings the students within the state's coercive powers.
See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); Lubbock
Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1046 (5th Cir.
1982).
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often are the heart of a person's identity;"3 it is the parent's role to
guide a child's religious maturation54 free from interference by the
state.55 Finally, conducting religious activities in the public schools
may cause the kind of conflict among the sects that the establish-
ment clause was intended to preclude.56
A. Engel v. Vitale
In Engel v. Vitale 57 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
a school board requirement that each public school class begin
every school day with the recitation of a prayer composed by the
New York State Board of Regents.58 Justice Black, writing for the
Court, stated that the establishment clause "must at least mean that
in this country it is no part of the business of government to com-
pose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite
as a part of a religious program carried on by government."
59
B. Abington School District v. Schempp
In Abington School District v. Schempp ° the Court considered the
constitutionality of religious exercises chosen by state government
officials. In particular, the challenge involved the Pennsylvania and
53. Note, supra note 6, at 379.
54. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226 ("The place of religion in our society is an
exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and
the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind."); id. at 273-74 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (" 'Religious teaching in our homes, Sunday schools, churches, by the good
mothers, fathers, and ministers ... is far preferable to compulsory teaching of religion
by the state. The spirit of ... [the Constitution] from the beginning . . . [has] been to
leave religious instruction to the discretion of parents.' "') (quoting D. BOLEs, THE BI-
BLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 238 (1961)).
55. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972).
56. Note, supra note 6, at 379. For an account of the historical controversy over
religion in the American public school system, see Schempp, 374 U.S. at 267-78 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
57. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
58. The prayer read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at
422. Justice Brennan thought the Regent's prayer not only unconstitutional but also
"rather bland." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 267 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
The Board of Regents recommended the prayer as part of their "Statement on
Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools," saying: "We believe that this Statement
will be subscribed to by all men and women of good will, and we call upon all of them to
aid in giving life to our program." Engel, 370 U.S. at 423.
59. Engel, 370 U.S. at 425. The fact that the Regent's prayer was nondenominational
and voluntary-a reluctant child could remain silent or leave the room--did not free it
from establishment clause violations. Id. at 430.
60. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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Maryland legislatures' requirement that every school conduct daily
Bible readings.6 1'
. After reviewing the Court's prior decisions under the establish-
ment clause 62 and reaffirming its adherence to the doctrine of gov-
ernment neutrality toward religion,63 Justice Clark set forth a two-
part test for determining whether a governmental activity violates
the establishment clause: "If either [the purpose or the primary ef-
fect of the enactment] is the advancement or inhibition of religion
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as cir-
cumscribed by the Constitution.... [T]here must be a secular legis-
lative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion."64 The Court found that the programs in both
states were unconstitutional because of their 'eligious character. 65
C. Wallace v. Jafree
After Engel and Schempp, many legal commentators opined that
school officials could reserve, without constitutional infirmity, a des-
ignated moment of silence in which students may choose to pray
silently.6" In Wallace v. Jaffree67 the Court considered for the first
61. The Pennsylvania statute provided: "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible
shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school
day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, .... upon the written request of
his parent or guardian." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (Purdon 1962). The defend-
ant school district added the requirement that the readings be followed by the recitation
of the Lord's Prayer. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 208.
In Maryland the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City adopted a rule
providing for opening exercises in the city's public schools consisting primarily of the
"reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's
Prayer." Id. at 211. By the time the Supreme Court heard the case the rule had been
amended to permit children to be excused from participating in or attending the open-
ing exercises upon the written request of a parent or guardian. Id at 211-12 n.4.
62. See id. at 217-22.
63. Id. at 222 ("wholesome" neutrality).
64. Id. The Schempp test became the first two prongs of the test set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
65. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
66. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-5, at 1169 n.4 (1988);
Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN.. L. REV.
329, 371 (1963); Dellinger, supra note 44, at 1632; Fordham, The Implications of the
Supreme Court Decisions Dealing with Religious Practices in the Public Schools, 6 J. CHURCH &
STATE 44, 55-56 (1964); Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L.
REv. 1031, 1041 (1963); Laycock, supra note 10, at 3; Stone, In Opposition to the School
Prayer Amendment, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 844 (1983); cf Loewy, supra note 28, at 1066
(mention of "voluntary prayer" does not necessarily render statute unconstitutional);
Comment, Constitutional Law--Religious Exercises and the Public Schools, 20 ARK. L. REV. 320,
352-53 (1967) [hereinafter Comment, Religious Exercises and the Public Schools] (all silent
moment legislation may be constitutionally permissible); Note, Need to Reform, supra note
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time the constitutionality of a moment-of-silence statute. Although
the Court invalidated a statute authorizing a period of silence "for
meditation or voluntary prayer," the majority implied that a pure
silent moment statute would not violate the establishment clause.68
Originally, three separate Alabama statutes were challenged in
Jaffree. The first statute provided that a minute of silence would be
observed "for meditation."69 The district court upheld this stat-
ute,7" and the plaintiffs did not challenge it on appeal. The second
statute authorized teachers to lead.all "willing students" in a statu-
torily prescribed prayer.7' In an earlier decision, the Supreme
Court upheld the lower court's decision to invalidate this statute, 2
thereby reaffirming its decisions in Engel and Schempp. A third stat-
ute permitted a period of silence "for meditation or voluntary
prayer."17 3 It was this latter statute that theJaffree Court considered
44, at 592 (school prayer statutes not unconstitutional unless coercive); Comment, supra
note 10, at 759 (constitutionality of school prayer statutes must be decided on case-by-
case basis); Note, supra note 10, at 1256 (mention of "voluntary prayer" constitutional).
But see Note, The Unconstitutionality of State Statutes Authorizing Moments of Silence in the Public
Schools, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1874, 1893 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Unconstitutionality of State
Statutes] (all silent moment legislation unconstitutional); Note, supra note 6, at 394
(same).
67. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
68. Id. at 59.
69. The 1978 meditation statute read:
At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the sixth
grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each
such class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed one
minute in duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any such pe-
riod silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (1987).
70. Jaifree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727, 732 (S.D. Ala. 1982) ("it is a statute which
prescribes nothing more than a child in school shall have the right to meditate in silence
and there is nothing wrong with a little meditation and quietness").
71. The voluntary prayer statute provided:
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institution
within the State of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the begin-
ning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing students in
prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following prayer to God:
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the Crea-
tor and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your truth, and Your
peace abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our
government, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classrooms of our schools
in the name of our Lord. Amen.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (1987).
72. Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984).
73. The 1981 "meditation or voluntary prayer" statute provided:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public
schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held may




Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, compared the three
statutes and noted that the first statute was a pure silence statute
and fully protected a student's right to choose to pray. 4 He said
that a statute enacted "for meditation or voluntary prayer," however,
did not serve the secular purpose of accommodating a student's reli-
gion or religious practice. 5 The silent prayer law only served to
promote "the State's endorsement . . . of religion and a particular
religious practice," '71 which is "not consistent with the established
principle that the government must pursue a course of complete
neutrality toward religion."177
The majority opinion strongly suggested that it is a permissible
purpose to protect a public school student's right to engage in vol-
untary prayer during a moment of silence: "The legislative intent to
return prayer to the public school is, of course, quite different from
merely protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary
prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school-
day."' 78 Therefore, the Court appeared to find the silent prayer stat-
ute unconstitutional because the state endorsed religion by
designating "prayer" as an officially approved use of a moment of
silence. The Court's position suggests that a pure silent moment
statute is constitutional.
Notably, both the concurring and dissenting opinions injaffree
further support a pure moment-of-silence statute. The dissent in
Jaffree would have upheld even the statute that expressly specified
observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no
other activities shall be engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1987).
74. Jafree, 472 U.S. at 57-58 n.45 (at the time the statute "for meditation or volun-
tary prayer" was enacted "there was no governmental practice impeding students from
silently praying for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday").
75. While the legislative history of the silent prayer law clearly showed that the stat-
ute was enacted for the sole purpose of returning "voluntary prayer" to the public
schools, see id. at 56-57, 57 n.43, the governor argued in his brief that the statute was
"best understood as a permissible accommodation of religion." Id. at 57 n.45. The
Court responded that there was no basis for the argument that the silent prayer statute
was " 'a means for accommodating the religious and meditative needs of students with-
out in any way diminishing the school's own neutrality or secular atmosphere.'" Id. at
58 n.45 (quoting Brief for United States as Anicus Curiae at 11, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985) (Nos. 83-812, 83-929)). The previously enacted pure silence statute fully
accommodated a student's choice to pray. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
76. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 58 n.45 ("precisely the aspect that makes the statute
unconstitutional").
77. Id. at 60. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
78. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 59. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.
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prayer. 79 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that silent
moment laws that do not expressly promote prayer would be consti-
tutional. She noted that it is "difficult to discern a serious threat to
religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchil-
dren." 0 Justice O'Connor would uphold even those silence stat-
utes that designate "prayer,""' as would have Justice Powell.82
Thus, at the time that Jaffree was decided, six members of the
court-Stevens, O'Connor, Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun-indicated that moment-of-silence statutes are not constitu-
tionally infirm if they do not promote or endorse religion by
emphasizing prayer as an officially preferred activity. All other
members of the Court-Burger, Rehnquist, and White-would up-
hold such a statute as well. The Court, narrowly decidingJaffree on
the Alabama statute's legislative history, has been criticized for not
setting forth the criteria for determining the constitutionality of
other moment-of-silence statutes."3 Nevertheless, the Court's opin-
ion does suggest that if provided the opportunity, it would uphold
statutes that create a pure moment of silence, but would invalidate
those in which the government promotes or endorses school
prayer.84
79. Id. at 89-90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (the silent prayer statute " 'endorses' only
the view that the religious observances of others should be tolerated and, where possi-
ble, accommodated"); id. at 90 (White, J., dissenting) (silence statute for meditation "or
prayer" constitutional); id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("endorsing" prayer does
not violate first amendment).
80. Id. at 73 (O'ConnorJ., concurring). See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203. 281 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the observance of a moment of rever-
ent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the solely secular purposes of the devo-
tional activities without jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any members of the
community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and
government").
81. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A moment of silence law that
is clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit prayer, meditation, and reflection
within the prescribed period, without endorsing one alternative over the others, should
pass . . . [the endorsement] test.") (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor believed the
Alabama statute's legislative history promoted prayer. Id. at 78.
82. Id. at 66 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute
[mentioning prayer] if it also had a clear secular purpose.").
83. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 1251 (Court able to decideJaffree because of
"'peculiar legislative history' " of the Alabama statute, but offered no new guidelines for
applying Lemon to other silent moment laws (quotingJaffree, 472 U.S. at 91 (White, J.,
dissenting))).
84. This implied holding of the Court was also recognized by Justice White in his
dissent. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting).
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IV. MOMENT-OF-SILENCE STATUTES
A. Arguments that All or Most Silent Moment Legislation is
Constitutional
TheJaffree Court's decision to invalidate the silent moment law
because of the Alabama legislature's inclusion of the word "prayer"
has been criticized as "unduly fastidious"85 by those who would
have sustained it. In his dissent, Justice White stated that the addi-
tion of the word "prayer" was not an endorsement of a religious
activity, but rather a message that prayer is merely a permitted activ-
ity.86 ChiefJustice Burger, also dissenting, asserted that the statute
requiring silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer" merely ac-
commodates the religious choices of those students who wish to
pray silently while also creating a time for secular reflection for
those who chose not to pray.87 The statute "endorses," Burger sug-
gested, only the view that the "religious observances of others
should be tolerated and, where possible, accommodated."88 Con-
curring inJaffree, Justice O'Connor also would find no endorsement
of religion in a silence statute merely because it designates voluntary
prayer as an approved activity. She noted that religion is endorsed
only when the state has "conveyed or attempted to convey the
message that children should use the moment of silence for
85. Dellinger, supra note 44, at 1636.
86. Wallace v. jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
argued that inserting the word "prayer" was no more unconstitutional than would be a
teacher answering in the affirmative if a student were to ask if prayer was permitted
during the moment of silence. Id. White's comparison, however, is flawed. The
teacher's proper response to a student's question, "may I pray," is not, "yes, you may."
Rather, "I think it would be better if you talked with your parents about prayer," is a
reply unequivocally neutral toward religion. A teacher's permission to pray easily could
be misconstrued by a young and impressionable child as encouragement, such encour-
agement being best left to the parents. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text;
infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
87. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 89-90. Burger continued:
If the government may not accommodate religious needs when it does so in a
wholly neutral and noncoercive manner, the "benevolent neutrality" that we
have long considered the correct constitutional standard will quickly translate
into the "callous indifference" that the Court has consistently held the Estab-
lishment Clause does not require.
Id. at 90. The Chief Justice added that to interpret a silence statute that mentions
"prayer" as an unconstitutional endorsement of religion, and to maintain that a statute
providing for a simple moment of silence does not, "manifests not neutrality but hostil-
ity toward religion." Id. at 85. But see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962) ("It is
neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this coun-
try should ... leave [the]... purely religious function[s] to the people themselves and to
those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.").
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prayer." 8 9
To assert that a state statute which explicitly refers to "prayer"
does not amount to state encouragement or endorsement of a reli-
gious practice ignores the very reason such a statute does endorse
religion. The addition of the word "prayer" is "utterly unnecessary
to the goal of creating a formal opportunity for reflection in which
students can, if they wish, choose to pray." 90 That goal is wholly
accomplished by a statute that designates a moment of silence for
"meditation" or "meditation or reflection. '  Furthermore,
designating "prayer" is unnecessary as an informational device, as
Justice White suggests.9" If a pure silence statute were enacted, par-
ents, priests, rabbis, and ministers could counsel their children or
parishioners or congregants that the silent moment be used for
prayer, thereby alleviating Justice White's concerns. The state
should not take the role of informing children as to when or
whether they may or should pray.93 When a state specifies in a stat-
ute that "prayer" is permitted, it "takes the state itself across a thin
line and into the improper business of official endorsement of a reli-
gious exercise."9 4
89. Jafree, 472 U.S. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Endorsement of religion would
occur. Justice O'Connor suggested, if a teacher encouraged children to use the moment
to pray or if the statute on its face or in its legislative history promoted prayer over the
other designated alternatives. Id. See also Dellinger. supra note 44, at 1639 n.37 (govern-
ment officials could promote particular religious practice in any number of ways so that
it would be impossible to specify those that violate the Constitution).
90. Dellinger, supra note 44. at 1636. See supra text accompanying note 78.
91. Because a formal opportunity for prayer is created by a pure silence statute,
there is no need to insert the word "prayer" as an ostensible accommodation of religion.
Thus ChiefJustice Burger misinterpreted exactly what a pure moment of silence statute
"accommodates." Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 38, 39 (1985) (Burger, Cj., dissenting).
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
93. See Board of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872) ("The great bulk of
human affairs and human interests is left by any free government to individual enter-
prise and individual action. Religion is eminently one of these interests, lying outside
the true and legitimate province of government."), quoted with approval in Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214-15 n.7 (1963).
94. Dellinger, supra note 44, at 1636. Justice White and others convinced, that the
mere mention of "prayer" is not an endorsement should consider Professor Dellinger's
analysis. Dellinger has advanced an interesting and very accurate comparison of a stat-
ute that designates "prayer" to one that designates an activity not quite as pure:
Imagine a state statute providing that a moment of silence be conducted at the
beginning of each school day for "meditation or erotic fantasy." Could one
plausibly say in that case that the state is being wholly "neutral" with regard to
"erotic fantasy," that the statute merely reflects the fact that students can (and
some no doubt will) use any period of silence for that purpose?
Id. It requires no stretch of the imagination to recognize the public outrage such a stat-
ute would evoke, parents and legislators alike chastising the statute's advocates for sug-
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B. Arguments that All Silent Moment Legislation is Unconstitutional
Those who would invalidate pure moment-of-silence statutes9 5
generally assert that the statutes lack a secular purpose, the first
prong of the Lemon test.96 In May v. Cooperman,97 for example, the
United States District Court for the District of NewJersey examined
a pure silent moment statute and found that the secular purpose
proffered by the statute's advocates-to provide a calming transition
from play to school work-was "pretextual," advanced only after
the commencement of litigation.9" The court found the statute in-
valid because it recognized no legitimate secular purpose.99
The problem with the Cooperman analysis, as Professor Dellinger
has noted, is the erroneous assumption that a literal secular purpose
is required.' °0 The first prong of the Lemon test requiring a secular
legislative purpose is an unfortunate shorthand reformulation of the
principle that the statute violates the establishment clause if its pur-
pose is either the advancement or inhibition of religion.' 0 ' A stat-
ute having no specifically articulated secular purpose, however, does
not necessarily promote or inhibit religion as its purpose. A statute
such as the one at issue in Cooperman provides those students who so
desire an opportunity to pray. The statute does not in that respect
have a purely secular purpose. The Supreme Court, however, has
acknowledged that even a silence statute "motivated in part by a
religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion" of the Lemon test. 0 2
gesting to aheir children (encouraging them) that the silence be spent conjuring licentious
images.
95. Comment, Religious Exercises and the Public Schools, supra note 66, at 352-53; Note,
Unconstitutionality of State Statutes, supra note 66, at 1893; Note, supra note 6, at 394.
96. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
97. 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985), appeal dis.
missed, 484 U.S. 72 (1987) (lack of jurisdiction).
98. Id. at 1572. The court recognized that a silent moment "can serve as a useful
boundary between nonschool activities and school work." Id. The court stated, how-
ever, that "only the utterly naive would conclude that the Bill's advocates were fighting
passionately for such a boundary." Id. at 1573. The real purpose behind the enactment
of the legislation was religious, the court said-to accommodate prayer in the public
schools. Id. at 1574.
99. Id. at 1573. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the ThirdCircuit
affirmed the lower court's invalidation of the neutral statute, May v. Cooperman, 780
F.2d 240, 253 (3d Cir. 1985), despite the Supreme Court's intervening decision inJaffree,
and the absence of any legislative intent to encourage prayer over the other designated
alternatives. Id. at 252.
100. Dellinger, supra note 44, at 1638.
101. Id. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), in which
Justice Clark equated the "advancement or inhibition of religion" with a lack of "secular
legislative purpose."
102. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985). Even if a pure silence statute were to
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In fact, the first amendment mandates that "a statute must be invali-
dated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." ' 3
A legislature that enacts a silent moment statute to create the op-
portunity for prayer does not necessarily have the sole purpose of
advancing religion.' 0 4 Advancing or endorsing religion requires
more overt governmental action than merely creating an open and
undesignated time for personal reflection. 0 5 A statute expressly
creating a moment of silence "for prayer" represents a deliberate
action evidencing a purpose to endorse religion. Because the crea-
tion of a pure moment of silence does not inhibit prayer, 10 6 a statute
designating that the time may be used "for prayer" unnecessarily
emphasizes religious practice 0 7 and ultimately endorses it.
C. Silence is Not Prayer
Pure moment-of-silence statutes comply with the limits of the
establishment clause for several reasons. First, the statutes are non-
contain in its legislative history statements by a sponsor who "hopes" that children use
the time for prayer, the statute still would be valid, While the legislator did not have a
"secular purpose," the legislator's subjective desire that children pray does not taint an
objectively pure statute. See Dellinger, supra note 44, at 1639.
103. Jaifree, 472 U.S. at 56 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
104. Id. Neither does the pure silence statute necessarily constitute a legislative "en-
dorsement" of religion in violation ofJustice O'Connor's interpretation of the purpose
prong. See supra note 44.
105. See supra note 89. Whether a moment-of-silence statute, neutral on its face, un-
constitutionally advances or endorses religion in its application requires case-by-case adju-
dication. For example, it is theoretically possible that two states, even neighboring
states, enact facially pure silent moment legislation identical in every respect except leg-
islative history. Imagine that the first state enacts a statute providing for "one minute of
quiet contemplation" for the secular purpose of a transition between the rigmarole of
daily adolescent existence and the contemplative atmosphere strived for in public ele-
mentary schools. The second state follows suit, also enacting a statute permitting the
observation of "one minute of quiet contemplation," but its legislative record is filled
with observations that the sole purpose of the act is "to promote spiritual adoration of
Our Almighty Creator through a daily moment of reflection on His glories." Both states
have silence statutes, pure on their face, but one statute is marred by legislative history
evidencing a solely religious intent. Under the analysis set forth in this comment, and
under the Lemon test, see supra text accompanying notes 41-43 and note 44, the first
statute would be found constitutional, the second an unequivocal violation of the estab-
lishment clause. Imagine that still another state enacted a silence statute that provided
for "one minute of quiet contemplation or prayer," and that the legislative history indi-
cated that the legislators wanted to provide the traditional moment of calm as well as
protect a child's right to pray. Such a statute would survive attack under the Lemon test,
see supra text accompanying notes 41-43 and note 44; however, because the statute de-
notes "prayer" as a permitted activity, it would not pass muster under this comment's
analysis.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
107. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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religious in that they allow a student to think about whatever he or
she wants during the silent time: they create a brief "open forum"
during which prayer constitutionally may occur on public school
grounds.' °8 Second, silence is not inherently religious because si-
lence is not automatically associated with a religious exercise. 1' 9
Professor Tribe has noted that " '[p]rayer' holds religious signifi-
cance for most people, and thus cannot be officially endorsed; 'med-
itation' holds religious significance for relatively few people, and
thus may be officially endorsed."°"0 Third, no child participating in
a moment of silence could be coerced to compromise his or her be-
liefs."' Fourth, a pure "moment of reverent silence"' 12 serves the
same secular objective-to " 'still the tumult of the playground and
start a day of study' "' '13-as a moment of silence for prayer without
jeopardizing individual religious liberties or the principle of church-
108. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (equal access to university facili-
ties required for student organized religious groups). Because establishment clause
analysis is more stringent when young and impressionable grade school students are
involved, the "open forum" the younger students enjoy is similar but not as expansively
interpreted as that granted university students.
109. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). On the
other hand, while silence in itself is not inherently religious, it can be a "powerful
message." Professor Dellinger noted:
Since a normal school day ordinarily includes any number of occasions during
which an individual student acting on her own initiative can engage in a mo-
ment of silent prayer or reflection, the formal creation in public-school class-
rooms of an organized, teacher-supervised moment of silence is an event that
has no readily apparent purpose-unless the government is attempting to con-
vey a message. Even where no textual mention is made of prayer, a community
of observers may well perceive the "meaning" of a school-organized moment
of silence is that the government is endorsing something, and that something
might be seen as religion.
Dellinger, supra note 44, at 1637 (footnotes omitted). Professor Dellinger, however, rec-
ognized that the Supreme Court nevertheless will sustain pure silence laws. Id. at 1636-
37. See also Redlich, Separation of Church and State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1094, 1135-36 (1985) (even though all "prescribed moments of
silence are highly suspect," a pure moment-of-silence law is probably valid "unless the
legislative history dilutes the purity").
110. L. rRIBE, supra note 66, § 14-6, at 1187.
I 1. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("a student who objects to
prayer is left to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or
thoughts of others"). See also Choper, supra note 66, at 371 ("since no student would
really know the subject of his classmates' reflections, no one could in any way be com-
pelled to alter his thoughts").
112. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 & n.57 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
113. Choper, supra note 66, at 371 & n.247 (quoting Editorial, Wash. Post, June 28,
1962, at A22, col. 2), quoted with approval in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 281 n.57 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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state separation.'4 Finally, there is no "serious threat to religious
liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren."' 15
D. Maryland's Silent Moment Legislation
On February 11, 1964, Delegate Thomas H. Lowe introduced
House Bill 80 in the Maryland House of Delegates to provide for "a
daily period of silent meditation for the students of every public ele-
mentary and secondary school in the State and relating also to
prayers, the reading of scripture, and the free exercise of religion in
the public schools."' 6 As introduced, the bill mandated that princi-
pals and teachers require students "to meditate silently . . . ; pro-
vided that no student or teacher.. . be prohibited from reading the
holy scripture, praying, or any other expression of the free exercise
of his religion."' "1 7 When enacted, Maryland's first silent moment
statute read:
§ 98A. Daily period of silent meditation.
Principals and teachers in every public elementary and
secondary school in this State may require all students at
these schools to be present and participate in opening ex-
ercises on each morning of a school day and to meditate
silently for approximately one moment; provided that no
student or teacher shall be prohibited from reading the
holy scripture, or praying.' 8
In 1978 laws pertaining to education were recodified into the
Education Article,' and the silent moment statute was revised:
§ 7-104. Daily period of silent meditation.
(a) Silent meditation.-Principals and teachers in each
public elementary and secondary school in this State may
require all students to be present and participate in open-
114. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring).
115. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Act of Apr. 7, 1964, ch. 189, 1964 Md. Laws 452. The last clause, "and the free
exercise of religion in the public schools," was stricken by amendment before the bill
was enacted. Id. Delegate Lowe introduced the silent moment bill approximately one
year after the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional daily Bible readings in public
schools in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205, and approximately two years after the Court held
unconstitutional the oral recitation of prayer in the public school classroom in Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
117. Act of Apr. 7, 1964, ch. 189, 1964 Md. Laws 452.
118. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 98A (1965). In 1969 article 77 was repealed and its
sections reenacted as part of either article 77, "Public Education," or article 77A,
"Higher Education." Former § 98A was recodified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 78
(Supp. 1969).
119. Act of Apr. 3, 1978, ch. 22, 1978 Md. Laws 219.
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ing exercises on each morning of a school day and to medi-
tate silently for approximately 1 minute.
(b) Praying or reading holy scripture.-During this period a
student or teacher may read the holy scripture or
pray .... 120
Subsection (a) is a pure silence provision and, standing alone, is
120. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-104 (1989). Section 7-104 has not been amended
since it first was enacted. In recent history several amendments, however, have been
proposed. For instance, Maryland's silent moment law gives principals and teachers dis-
cretion whether to conduct a silent moment. Most proposed amendments have sought
to make the moment of silence mandatory. In the House of Delegates, an amendment
that would make silent moments mandatory on every morning of every school day in
Maryland's public schools has been introduced several times. In 1976 27 delegates in-
troduced H.B. 1401, which read in part: "Principals and teachers in every public ele-
mentary and secondary school in this State [may] SHALL require all students at these
schools to be present and.participate in opening exercises on each morning of a school
day ...... H.B. 1401, 1976 Sess. (brackets indicate proposed deletions from existing
law; capitals indicate proposed additions). After the first reading, the bill was referred to
the House Judiciary Committee. See 1976 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 1050.
The principal delegate introducing H.B. 1401, Delegate Decatur W. Trotter, was
not deterred by the bill's demise; he introduced the same amendment in the two suc-
ceeding years. See H.B. 4, 1977 Sess.; H.B. 394, 1978 Sess.
In 1981 eleven delegates introduced the same amendment. See H.B. 990, 1981
Sess. No further amendments to Maryland's silent moment law have originated in the
House of Delegates.
In the Senate the same amendment to make a silent moment mandatory has been
introduced several times. In 1977 SenatorJoseph S. Bonvegna introduced S.B. I on the
same day Delegate Trotter introduced H.B. 4 in the House of Delegates. See S.B. I,
1977 Sess. S.B. I was not as short-lived as its counterpart in the House. It received a
favorable vote in the Senate and was referred to the House of Delegates. 1977JOURNAL
OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 3359. S.B. I was read in the House and referred to the
House Judiciary Committee. 1977 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES 3156.
In 1978 Senator Bonvegna again proposed the same amendment to Maryland's si-
lent-moment law. See S.B. 261, 1978 Sess. See S.B. 261 was defeated in the Senate
before it received a second reading.
In 1982 Senator Bonvegna introduced a different amendment to the silence law for
the purpose of "requiring public school students to participate in either prayer, medita-
tion, or the reading of the holy scripture during a certain school period." S.B. 2, 1982
Sess. One publicized discussion of the bill indicated that its purpose was to put back
into the public school system prayer and the Bible. See The Evening Sun (Baltimore),
Feb. 10, 1982, at F3, col. 5. There was no stated or apparent secular purpose for the
proposed changes. As introduced, S.B. 2 read in part:
(a) Principals and teachers in each public elementary and secondary school
in this State may require all students to be present and participate in opening
exercises on each morning of a school day [and to meditate silently for approxi-
mately I minute].
(b) During this period, [a student or teacher may read the holy scripture or
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constitutional. 2 ' Because it does not state that prayer or any other
religious activity is permitted during the silent moment, the
Supreme Court should find that it comports with the strictures of
the first amendment. Moreover, subsection (a) does not compro-
mise Maryland's neutrality toward the religious convictions of its
residents. It does not propel the state across the "thin line"' 22 sep-
arating constitutional legislation that protects the freedom to wor-
ship according to one's conscience from official endorsement of
religion or a religious exercise. Section 7-104(a) provides the op-
pray.] EACH OF THE STUDENTS PRESENT SHALL PARTICIPATE IN
ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:
(i) PRAYER;
(2) READING OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURE; OR
(3) MEDITATION.
Id. (brackets indicate proposed deletions from existing law; capitals indicate proposed
additions). S.B. 2 removed the discretion afforded teachers and principals under MD.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-104 (1989) as it now is enacted. The proposed amendments also
replaced the emphasis of § 7-104(a) upon silent meditation with a blatant emphasis
upon religion by highlighting conspicuously three permitted activities, the first two of
which were "Prayer" and "Reading of the Holy Scripture." S.B. 2 was referred to the
Senate Finance Committee, which amended the bill so that it was identical to the previ-
ous unsuccessful amendments to make a silent moment mandatory, substituting "shall"
for 'may" in subsection (a) of the bill and striking all other amendments proposed by
Senator Bonvegna. 1982 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 2676-77. The Fi-
nance Committee returned a favorable report, id. at 2720, and S.B. 2 as amended passed
easily in the Senate and was referred to the House of Delegates. Id. at 2895. In the
House, S.B. 2 was referred to the Committee on Constitutional and Administrative Law.
1982 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 262 1.
The most recently proposed amendment to Maryland's silence statute, S.B. 820,
1984 Sess., was introduced by Senator Bonvegna and six other senators in 1984. 1984
JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 690-91. S.B. 820 was identical to S.B. 2 as
Senator Bonvegna had introduced the latter bill two years before. The Committee on
Constitutional and Public Law did not amend S.B. 820 to the extent that the Committee
on Finance amended the 1982 bill, choosing only to remove the language mandating a
child's participation in the organized silent moment. Id. at 1711, 1779-80. The Commit-
tee did not delete the conspicuous enumeration of the permitted activities. Id. S.B. 820
as amended failed to receive a constitutional majority of the vote during its third reading
in the Senate and thereby was defeated. 1984 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE
2716-17.
121. See 67 Op. Att'y Gen. 37, 41-42 (1982) ("current case law suggests no constitu-
tional problem posed by a period of silent meditation, as now permitted under § 7-
104"). In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203 (1963), justice Brennan
noted in his concurrence:
It has not been shown that ... the observation of a moment of reverent silence
at the opening of class, may not adequately serve the solely secular purposes of
the devotional activities [prayer, reading of Holy Scripture] without jeopardiz-
ing either the religious liberties of any members of the community or the
proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and government.
Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring). But cf. supra note 109 (silent moment legislation is
highly suspect despite its constitutionality).
122. l)ellinger, supra note 44, at 1636.
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portunity for prayer without promoting a sectarian practice. AsJus-
tice Brennan observed in Schempp, it has not been shown that
the observance of a moment of reverent .silence at the
opening of class, may not adequately serve the solely secu-
lar purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardiz-
ing either the religious liberties of any members of the
community or the proper degree of separation between the
spheres of religion and government.'"s
The quiet moment under subsection (a) has a constitutional and sec-
ular purpose because it attempts to put students in a frame of mind
conducive to learning before the school day begins.
Section 7-104(b), however, renders Maryland's silent moment
statute unconstitutional. By specifying that the silent moment may
be spent praying or reading Holy Scripture, the Maryland legisla-
ture oversteps constitutional boundaries by endorsing religion and
religious activities.124 In Jafree 125 Justice Stevens compared Ala-
bama's pure silence statute with its statute permitting "meditation
or voluntary prayer,"'' 2 6 and noted that the statute mentioning
prayer promoted religion in violation of the government's man-
dated course of absolute neutrality toward religion. 127 Unlike the
statute struck down in Jafree, the Maryland silence statute is not
marred by a legislative record indicating that the return of prayer
and the Holy Scripture to the public school classroom was the sole
purpose behind its enactment.12' Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court's indication inJaffree that it would uphold pure silence stat-
123. 374 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring). Some of the secular purposes ad-
vanced by the proponents of the statute at issue in Schempp were "fostering harmony and
tolerance among the pupils, enhancing the authority of the teacher, and inspiring better
discipline." Id. at 280.
124. Maryland's Attorney General Stephen H. Sachs opined, however, that the men-
tion of prayer in § 7-104 is constitutionally permissible:
Nor is a statute that, like present § 7-104, permits a required meditation
period during which a student or teacher may silently pray or read the Holy
Scripture necessarily invalid. As previously observed, § 7-104(b) "reflects
nothing more than a concern that no student or teacher, by virtue of this stat-
ute, be denied the free exercise of his or her religion."
67 Op. Att'y Gen. 37, 42 (1982) (quoting Letter of Advice (S.B. 1) from George A.
Nilson, Deputy Attorney General, to James Clark, Jr., President of the Senate (Feb. 7,
'1977)). The Attorney General wrote the opinion three years before the Supreme
Court's decision in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
125. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
126. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
127. 472 U.S. at 60. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
128. SeeJaffree, 472 U.S. at 56-57 (sponsor of bill that became Alabama's silent-mo-
ment statute testified at trial that he had no other purpose for the legislation).
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utes and invalidate those mentioning prayer129 suggests that the
Court would declare unconstitutional section 7-104 because of the
reference to prayer in subsection (b).
Those who argue that subsection (b) merely ensures that stu-
dents and teachers have the opportunity to pray and read Holy
Scripture during the silence are unpersuasive. Subsection (b) is en-
tirely unnecessary to accomplish this goal.' 3 ° Under section 7-
104(a), a student may contemplate or read anything--be it religious,
nonreligious or irreligious--during the silent moment. For those
students who wish to begin their school day with prayer, subsection
(a) grants them the formal opportunity. Likewise, students wishing
to read the Holy Scripture may do so as well. Subsection (b), on the
other hand, encourages religious contemplation. Subsection (b)
emphasizes and endorses religion and religious activities in direct
violation of the establishment clause. As Justice Brennan has noted,
"the State acts unconstitutionally if it either sets about to attain even
indirectly religious ends by religious means, or if it uses religious
means to serve secular ends where secular means would suffice."''
By including subsection (b) in section 7-104 the Maryland legisla-
ture has used religious means where secular ones would suffice. If
the legislature desires to create a constitutional moment of silence
in the public schools, it should amend section 7-104, expunging all
specific references to religion or religious activity. ' 2
V. CONCLUSION
Twenty-five years ago the Supreme Court declared that man-
dated prayer in the public schools violates the first amendment.
The Court has extended this holding to invalidate a silent moment
statute that even mentions prayer in the classroom. The Court,
however, has implied that pure moment-of-silence statutes would
comply with the commands and intent of the first amendment.
Those who wonder aloud why a moment-of-silence statute that
merely mentions "prayer" is dangerous may be trying to push more
religion through the doors of the American public schools than the
Constitution permits to enter. They fail to realize that silence per-
mits prayer in the public schools. Silence permits every conceivable secular
129. See supra text accompanying note 84.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
131. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
132. Repealing subsection (b) would leave subsection (a) to accomplish constitution-
ally the legislature's goal.
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or sectarian thought. Those who insist that even a pure silent moment
statute is an endorsement of religion may be correct. But the estab-
lishment clause was not intended to invalidate all governmental ac-
tivity that could be construed as incidentally religious. Rather, the
establishment clause was intended to neither advance nor inhibit
religion. Silence may permit prayer, but it is not subterfuge to pro-
mote it.
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